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THE IMPACT OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF ENLISTED WOMEN
As the Army moves ahead with transformation we must consider the impact this transformation will have on the overall integration of women in the enlisted Army. Many aspects of transformation must be defined as they relate to organizations, occupations and doctrine; therefore, the exact impact of transformational changes is difficult to quantify. What can be quantified and analyzed are the following three aspects of transformation. First, there is the transition of the Army's legacy light infantry brigades and armored cavalry regiment to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Second, is the eventual transition of the remaining legacy force units and SBCT's to the Objective Force (Unit of Action). Third, is the planned reduction in the combat service support (CSS) structure in Total Army Analysis (TAA) 09-11 that will support the transformed Army both on the operational and institutional sides.
Opportunities for women to serve in the enlisted ranks have increased dramatically over the past twenty years, leading to an ever-increasing percentage of women in the enlisted force. If the intent of Army leadership is to maintain or continue to expand women's roles and opportunities in the enlisted force, then the transformation of our fighting organizations and the reduction of CSS positions supporting theses organizations must not be an impediment to that integration.
THE EVOLUTION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY
During World War II, the 350,000 women who served in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) were employed mainly in the administration and medical fields and were considered temporary support to free more men for combat related duty. After World War II, President Truman and Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, which gave women a permanent place in the military services, but also placed a limit on the number of women who could serve. This law stipulated that women could make up no more than 2 percent of the total enlisted force, could not serve as commanders, could not be promoted above the permanent grade of Lieutenant Colonel, and could not be assigned to combat ships or aircraft. Because this combat exclusion applied mainly to the Navy and Air Force, the Army followed Congressional intent and created guidelines that prevented women from serving in units and in occupations that involved direct combat
Since the 1948 Women's Armed Services Integration Act, opportunities for women to serve in the Army enlisted force have increased dramatically. In 1967, Congress lifted the 2 percent cap on women in the enlisted force and allowed women to serve as general officers.
However, the services still maintained the authority to determine its combat exclusion policy, and with that, the Army could still assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Army without restriction. The Army also created the Direct Combat Probability Code (DCPC) system to support the new exclusion policy. The codes ranged from P1 to P7; the lower the P-rating, the higher the probability of routine engagement in direct combat. As a result of this exclusion policy 55 MOS were closed to women equating to 29 percent of the Army's enlisted authorizations.
Additionally, another 18 percent of the enlisted authorizations were closed to women based on the DCPC system 3 . These positions excluded women based on MOS duties, unit mission, and type of unit or for other reasons. Combining the two categories reveals that 47 percent of all enlisted spaces were closed to women when the exclusion policy and DCPC system went into effect.
In 1988 the Department of Defense (DOD) created the Risk Rule, which set a single evaluative standard for all the services to use when classifying specialties and units as male only. The impact on the Army was that women would be excluded from certain non-combat units or areas on the battlefield if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire or capture were equal to or greater than the risk experienced by associated combat units in the same theater of operations.
Following the repeal of the prohibition on the assignment of women to combat aircraft in 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin directed the services to open up more specialties and assignments to women; however, he allowed the Army and Marines to continue to exclude women from direct combat positions. His memorandum to the services stated " Two years ago, Congress repealed the law that prohibited women from being assigned to combat aircraft. It is now time to implement that mandate and address the remaining restrictions on the assignment of women." Two significant changes in law and policy were instituted in 1994 which were major steps forward in expanding the opportunities for women in the Army. First, The National Defense Authorization Act established guidelines for the integration of women specialties previously closed. The Act stated:
• Ensure that qualification for and continuance in occupational career fields is evaluated on the basis of a common, relevant performance standard and not on the basis of gender;
• Refrain from the use of gender quotas, goals, or ceilings, except as specifically authorized by Congress; and
• Refrain from changing occupational standards simply to increase or decrease the number of women in an occupational career field 4 Second, Secretary of Defense Aspin rescinded the Risk Rule and established a DOD wide direct ground combat assignment rule which allows women to be assigned to all positions in which they qualify; but exempts them for serving in units below brigade headquarters level because the primary mission is direct ground combat. Direct ground combat was defined as:
engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.
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As a direct result of these evolutionary policy changes governing the assignment and utilization of women, there are now greater opportunities for women to serve. Correspondingly, the number of women as a percent of the enlisted force has steadily increased. As shown in Figure 1 , the Army's enlisted female population has increased six-fold over the past 29 years.
As far back as 1973, women constituted only 2.6 percent of the Active Army. 
CURRENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES
The Army assignment policy regarding women instituted in January 1994 under Secretary of Defense Aspin is still governing assignment and utilization policies in 2002. This policy follows the DOD-wide direct ground combat assignment rule which allows all service members to be assigned to all positions for which they qualify, but excludes women from serving in combat arms occupations (infantry, armor, field artillery, special forces, and short range air defense artillery) and in units below brigade level whose primary mission is ground combat. While the Army rescinded the risk rule and coding of positions from P1 to P7 to reflect the probability of engaging in direct combat, it did retain a form of probability coding. The Army codes all enlisted positions as either "E" male only or "I" interchangeable meaning men or women can fill the position. This coding system takes into account both the MOS's that are 
CURRENT UTILIZATION OF WOMEN
While there has been a significant and steady increase in the proportion of women soldiers over the last 20 years, women today still tend to serve in the same traditional occupations as their predecessors. Simply comparing the level of female fill to make judgments on whether the CMF has too many or too few females is not a valid analysis because it does not take into account opportunities for females to serve in the CMF. To ensure a fair comparison of women fill in the CMF's we need to look at the proportion of women that fill the interchangeable positions. In this analysis it is important to use operating strength (total strength minus TTHS) and not total strength since we are comparing the actual fill of positions in units. 
THE TRANSFORMATION ROAD MAP
There are three key elements of transformation under consideration that will reduce the number of interchangeable positions and along with that, the number of CSS positions. 
FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES COMPRISING SOME TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES COMPRISING SOME NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS
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Therefore these elements have the potential to impede and even reverse the consistent progress women have made over the years in integrating into the enlisted force.
The first element is the planned transition of four active component legacy force light infantry brigade task forces and one Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to the SBCT organization. Under current planning, these five legacy units will transition to the SBCT . An assumption is that there will be no force structure cuts which would reduce the number of brigades transforming.
The third element of transformation that could impact on women's integration is the planned reductions in logistics and administrative positions from the force structure as a bill payer for the SBCT's/Objective Force and to reduce the Army's logistics footprint in the combat zone. This is a valid assumption based on published statements of intent to reduce the logistics footprint through technology and development of new logistics concepts
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THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF TRANSFORMATION ON WOMEN IN THE ENLISTED FORCE
To assess the impact of these three elements of transformation on female integration in the enlisted force we must make several comparisons. First we must assess the impact of transforming the five active component legacy brigades/ACR to the SBCT structure. Next we must assess the impact of transforming all of the 33 active component brigades and ACR's to the Unit of Action structure and lastly, we must assess the impact of planned CSS force structure cuts in TAA 09-11. In these comparisons, it is important to look not only at the impacts on the number of interchangeable positions, but also on the impacts on the more traditional occupations of administration, medical, supply and services, and transportation where women densities are highest.
First we will access the potential impact transition to the five SBCT's may have on female integration. It is important to note that the five planned active component SBCT's are all light infantry or light cavalry type brigades/regiments. The overall impact of transitioning the five legacy force brigades/ACR to the SBCT on opportunities for women to serve at brigade level will be minimal. However, opportunities to serve in administration, where they comprise 45 percent of the interchangeable positions are cut substantially. Therefore more women will have to be recruited to serve in supply and services, transportation or in some of the nontraditional occupations to offset the loss in administration and medical.
Next, we will look what impact transforming all 33 of the legacy brigade task forces, ACR's, and SBCT's to the Unit of Action will have on women's integration. In this analysis, we will compare transforming the 5 SBCT's, and the remaining 10 legacy light brigades and 18 legacy heavy brigades/ACR. 
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. TAA09 and the initiative to replace some 71L's in units with 74B
Information Systems Operator-Analysts will reduce requirements by 1,331
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. The TOE Force Development Update reduces the requirements by 3,500 and future TDA cuts reduce the requirements another 2,000
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. Combined, these requirement reductions take 71L from 10,000 to 3,000, which is a 70 percent cut in total requirements. To translate these future requirements to authorizations is guess work at this time. However, if the same requirements to authorizations ratio were to exist as it does today then 3,000 requirements translates into 2,696 authorizations.
We also do not know proportion of the positions that would be interchangeable. However, if the same 96 percent ratio were to exist as it does today then 2,696 total positions would equate to 2,588 coded interchangeable. This reflects elimination of 6,033 71L interchangeable positions.
Since women fill 45 percent of the CMF 71 interchangeable positions, this equates to a potential loss of 2,714 women.
As a result of working the TAA 11 process and logistics transformation, the Combined Arms Service Support Command (CASCOM) proposes significant personnel savings in both the proposed personnel savings would equate to a loss of 151 women from the inventory (13,821 -13,191 = 630 x 24 percent).
THE COMBINED IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN
The overall impact of these elements of transformation on interchangeable positions and female strength is displayed in anywhere between 51k and 55k. This reduction lowers the female percent of the enlisted force from the current 15.5 percent to between 12.7 and 13.7 percent respectively.
COURSES OF ACTION TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
To ensure that transformation does not create unintended consequences in accessions quantity or quality, and does not impede the steady progress women have made in their opportunity to serve, the Army will need to review it's policy concerning the assignment of women. There are three institutional barriers that impede more women from entering into the non-traditional occupations. Until one or more of these barriers are removed, the Army will not foster an environment which will allow for greater opportunities for women to serve. The first barrier is the prohibition of women from serving in virtually all combat arms occupations. The second barrier is that combat units and all positions in those units are coded as male only and are therefore closed to women, even if the occupational field, e.g., administration, supply, food service and medical are open. The third barrier is the Armed Forces Standard Vocational Assessment Battery (ASVAB) which is the entrance test used to match recruits to occupations.
The ASVAB screens out some recruits from technical occupations because the test is based on exposure to certain subject matter and experience instead of aptitude
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. Until the ASVAB is changed to measure aptitude, then the numbers of women who access into the more nontraditional occupations, e.g., mechanic, engineer, air defense artillery and signal will remain low.
Policy change options open for consideration should include the following: 1. Open MOS's currently closed to women, mainly in the combat arms; 2. Recode positions from "male only" to "interchangeable" to allow women opportunities to serve in direct ground combat units in occupations currently open to them, e.g., medic, supply specialist and personnel specialist; and . Therefore, if the Army is to continue its quality and quantity recruiting successes in the years to come, women accessions will play a significant role.
The Army could open some or all of its combat arms occupations to women. However, from a manning the force, readiness and cohesion perspective, there is no real need to expand the opportunities for women through opening up combat arms occupations. It is believed that integration of women into combat arms units lacks both congressional and public support for several reasons. First, from an accessions perspective there is an adequate number of men to fill these positions. Second, doing so would not contribute to unit readiness and cohesion because of women's physical strength and stamina limitations and privacy concerns. Third, servicewomen do not support the involuntary assignment of women to combat arms units.
Fourth, women have shown little propensity or desire to serve in combat occupations
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Therefore, this course of action is neither suitable nor feasible. While it would expand the opportunities for women to serve, it is unlikely that women would volunteer for these combat arms occupations in any significant numbers to help mitigate the problem.
The Army could allow the assignment of women to all of its direct ground combat units in 
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. Therefore, this course of action is both suitable and feasible, but it is unlikely to expand the opportunities for women to the degree needed to mitigate the problem.
CONCLUSION
This leaves as perhaps the most feasible course of action, the need to access more women applicants into the more nontraditional occupations as a way to ensure the percentage of women and their opportunities to serve are not impeded by transformation. The Army could accomplish this by increasing female fill targets in the more non-traditional occupational specialties and then adjust recruiting strategies and retention incentives to work toward these targets. This course of action will require a retooling of the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude
Battery or development of a better way to measure aptitude versus experience as a way to expand the female accessions base.
As the Army moves ahead with transformation we must consider the impact transformation may have on the overall integration of enlisted women in the Army. The continued presence of women in the Army, and in the numbers that preserve readiness and represent integration and inclusion, is both a commitment and requirement. We have the opportunity through policy change options to ensure transformation does not impede this commitment to integration and the requirement to attract recruits in the right quantity and quality to man the force.
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